When I was the head of our party and government, we decreased the size of our army both in the Soviet Union and in the fraternal [Warsaw Pact] countries. Some people who read my memoirs may misinterpret that policy and say it was wrong for us to cut back our troop levels. I think the majority of those who might take this” view can be found among the military. However, I’m convinced we were right to do what we did. I’m still in favor of removing Soviet troops from other countries, and would fight for implementing that policy if I could. But how can anyone fight for the reduction of armed forces when a certain orator * is preaching quite the opposite? How can anyone propagate the doctrine I’ve been advocating if the troops under the command of this orator are stationed on the territory of other countries? We can’t make propaganda [for peaceful coexistence and noninterference] and then turn around and put our troops in other countries. Under such circumstances, our propaganda tends to be regarded with suspicion. It accomplishes nothing and earns the confidence of no one.

We must press for arms control. In my day we were able to persuade the imperial!sts that it was in their interests, as well as in ours, to limit the arms race. During my political career we reached a partial agreement on nuclear testing. We agreed to ban tests in three spheres: the air, the land, and under water. The treaty was signed in Moscow on August 5, 1963. It was a good beginning, but the United States refused to include underground tests in the ban.

While it might still be true that the United States has quantitative advantage over us—and that NATO has a quantitative advantage over the Warsaw Pact —in terms of total accumulated means of destruction, we no longer lag behind to any significant degree. In my last years as head of the government, our military theoreticians calculated that we had the nuclear capacity to blast our enemies into dust. We stockpiled enough weapons to destroy the principal cities of the United States, to say nothing of our potential enemies in Europe.

Therefore, I think there is no longer any reason for us to resist the idea of international control. If I had any influence on the policy of the Soviet Union, I would urge that we sign a mutual agreement providing for on-site inspection in designated parts of the country around our [western] frontiers.

Sticking to the matter of our relations with the West, I’d also favor on-site inspection at all military bases, especially airfields. It’s essential that airfields be open to inspection, so that neither side could concentrate troop transports for a sneak attack. We’re afraid of a surprise attack by our enemies just as much as they’re afraid of such an attack by us. We need a system of inspection as much as they do.

In short, I would like to see us sign a mutual treaty of nonaggression and inspection. I emphasize “mutual.” The treaty would have to be genuinely reciprocal; neither side should try to deceive or cheat the other.

“But what about espionage?” people might ask. “Wouldn’t we be inviting NATO to send spies into our country masquerading as control-commission inspectors?” My answer to that is: We’ll learn as much about the other side’s military technology as it will learn about ours. In other words, we will have the same opportunities as our potential enemies to engage in military intelligence. After all, what is military intelligence but an attempt to find out what your adversary is doing? And isn’t that basically the same thing as arms-control inspection? Both sides are engaged in military intelligence. As long as there are two opposing social systems in the world, those whose profession is espionage won’t be out of a job.

Besides, I was never too impressed by our ability to keep secrets from the enemy. The size and composition of our army was supposedly top secret, but the Americans and British knew that information anyway.

Up until now, I’ve hesitated to mention my thoughts on extending arms control over rocket technology and the deployment of warheads. You could say I’ve been saving the subject for dessert. Missiles are the most destructive means of all—and I don’t care whether you call them offensive or defensive. I believe that until we have established mutual trust with our current adversaries, our ICBMS must be kept in readiness as our major deterrent. It is to be hoped that someday missiles too can be included in a disarmament agreement; but for the time being, our ICBMS are necessary to maintain the balance of fear.

What if the capitalists drag their feet in agreeing to disarmament? I believe that even if a Soviet-American agreement on bilateral reduction in military spending were impossible, we should go ahead and sharply reduce our own expenditures—unilaterally. If our enemies want to go on inflating their military budgets, spending their money right and left on all kinds of senseless things, then they’ll be sure to lower the living standards of their own people.

Any leadership which conducts a policy of arms control and disarmament must be courageous and wise. The members of that leadership must be able to exercise their own independent judgment and not let others intimidate them. Who, in our own country, are the “others” who can intimidate the leadership? They are the military. I don’t reproach the military for that—they’re only doing their job. The military is made up of men who are ready to sacrifice their lives for the sake of their motherland. However, leaders must be careful not to look at the world through the eyeglasses of the military. Otherwise, the picture will appear terribly gloomy; the government will start spending all its money and the best energies of its people on armaments—with the result that pretty soon the country will have lost its pants in the arms race.

When I say “the government,” I mean the collective leadership, and I stress the word collective. When I was the head of the government and also held the highest post in the Central Committee, I never made a decision without securing approval of my comrades in the leadership. The conditions were such that it was impossible for one man to dictate his will to the others; I was in favor of those conditions, and I did my best to reinforce them.

I also did my best to resist the counsel of those who can’t stop shouting “We’ll destroy our enemies! We’ll wipe them out!” It requires considerable inner maturity and a well-developed understanding of the world not only to grasp the narrow bureaucratic aspects of defense policy, but also to see things in the broader perspective.

A government leader should keep in mind exactly what sort of destruction we’re capable of today. He should be aware of the losses his own country will suffer if, God willing, he were able to destroy his enemies. There are those who don’t seem able to get it into their heads that in the next war the victor will be barely distinguishable from the vanquished. A war between, the Soviet Union and the United States would almost certainly end in mutual defeat.

* The “orator” is clearly Leonid Brezhnev, whom Khrushchev seems to be castigating for the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

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